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Fundamentals for immediate implementation of a quantum secured Internet
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(Dated: 16 August 06. A typo in the eigenvalues in version V1 was corrected and a few short comments added.)
This work shows how a secure Internet for users A and B can be implemented through a fast key
distribution system that uses physical noise to encrypt information transmitted in deterministic
form. Starting from a shared secret random sequence between them, long sequences of fresh random
bits can be shared in a secure way and not involving a third party. The shared decrypted random
bits -encrypted by noise at the source- are subsequently utilized for one-time-pad data encryption.
The physical generated protection is not susceptible to advances in computation or mathematics.
In particular, it does not depend on the difficulty of factoring numbers in primes. Also, there is
no use of Linear Feed Back Shift Registers. The attacker has free access to the communication
channels and may acquire arbitrary number of copies of the transmitted signal without lowering
the security level. No intrusion detection method is needed.
PACS 03.67.Dd , 05.40.Ca
INTRODUCTION
Are there conditions to have a physical-noise secured
Internet (NSI)-instead of a relying on the difficulty of
factoring numbers in primes- implemented for common
users? The answer is Yes; and the associated cost is
very low – this paper shows how it can be immediately
implemented.
Let us start with the following classical scenario: User
A (Alice) uses a (private) laptop with no network or web
access to encrypt a message X onto a file C to be sent
to end user B (Bob). The encryption is done with a one-
time-pad key sequence of truly random bits stored in his
computer. This random sequence was beforehand shared
with B. File C is fully characterized and transferred to
a computer with web access. From this point on file C
is appended with all identification information, split into
different packets –as demanded by the Internet protocol
(IP) stack [1]– and routed through any available phys-
ical link to the end user B . All modifications are done
according to the requirements of the Open Systems Inter-
connection (OSI) layers and protocols [2] including par-
ticularities demanded by web service providers. Among
these procedures error correction protocols are included.
At the destination, file C is assembled bit-by-bit and de-
livered to B. Stripped from communication information
attached to it, B checks for file integrity and decrypt C
using the shared random sequence. The obtained mes-
sage has unconditionally proven confidentiality and au-
thentication. These procedures are independent of any
established Internet security protocol. It is expected that
Internet should not modify the bit content of the original
file after its full recover by B. In case A and B are per-
forming a commercial operation, non-repudiation is eas-
ily assured to both users. The one-time-pad protocol is
not intended to modify the Internet protocols in anyway.
It is a complementary method for secure communication
between two users that works independently and on top
of all IP protocols. A and B have their secure commu-
nication totally under their control. This way, the users
know that their protection does not rely on mathemat-
ical difficulties to factoring number in primes nor they
depend on third parties to assure the desired security.
The reader may be saying: But this is a classical en-
cryption between two users and well known to be secure;
there is nothing physical or new here. However, is this
scenario realistic if A and B wishes to use it continu-
ously? The answer to this question has been negative:
The practical difficulties for A and B to keep sharing
long sequences of one-time-pad keys makes this scenario
highly inefficient and, therefore, useless for most uses.
Practical systems have not yet been devised that allow
A and B to use the starting secret K0 as a support to
transfer or exchange fresh sequences of random numbers.
This work shows a practical way that allows A and
B to share through the Internet these new sequences of
random keys in a secure way. This could bring life to
the starting scenario. The basic ingredients needed are a
very simple software, a physical random generator (not
a pseudo random generator) coupled to the private com-
puter and a starting secret key K0 shared by A and B.
This starting sequence K0 will seed a long sequence of
truly random bits. In a sense, it can be seen as a one-
time-pad booster: Starting from a shared seedK0, A and
B end up sharing a sequence of L (>> K0) random bits.
No third party is used to establish the key sequences to
be used by A and B. No need for intrusion detection ex-
ists. Furthermore, all of these elements allow immediate
implementation – even commercial (truly) random gen-
erators exist [3] for moderate speeds.
One may also argue that some quantum protocols ex-
ist that are proven secure as the well known single pho-
ton protocol BB84 [4] to distribute random bit sequences
and, therefore, what novelty is being offered? Single-
2photon protocols cannot be amplified and therefore do
not work for the long-haul communications necessary for
the Internet. Furthermore, signals from single-photon
protocols cannot be converted from optical to electrical
and back to optical without loss of security. Nor they
are practical for wavelength multiplexing (WDM). These
steps are necessary for the Internet. Alternative systems
such as those using discrete or continuous variable pro-
cesses relying on homodyne measurements (e.g., [5]) are
very sensitive to noise. This leads to low key rate transfer
and, even more serious, they cannot work in the naturally
disturbed and complex Internet networks. In this sense,
direct quantum communication over the Internet is not
realistic.
On the other hand, some advantages of this NSI are:
1) The protocol is established at the user level where
the secure data/message is prepared. This message/data
is deterministic and noiseless but carries, as it will be
shown, truly random information that was generated by
a physical process. The key distribution procedure uses
the installed communication network but its protection
depends on physical laws instead of mathematical com-
plexities. 2) The data is prepared in any convenient form
for the underlying OSI layers with no need for modifica-
tion of the IP in use. A simple binary file can be prepared
by A or B to be sent through the OSI stack. These char-
acteristics will not be dependent of security procedures
established at the OSI’s “Presentation” layer. Normal
data manipulation demanded by OSI protocols can be
applied. The only and usually expected requirement is
that the end user receives the data file as it was deliv-
ered by the sender, bit-by-bit. This presupposes use of
error correction protocols to guarantee perfect delivery of
the ciphered message to the end user. The IP protocols
in use are then left untouched; just a private protection
layer is added by the users. This added layer, under user’s
control, presents no risk in the eventual creation of algo-
rithms for fast factoring of numbers in primes. Also, even
creation of a quantum computer or quantum processors
does not decrease the physical protection tied to the sig-
nals. There resides the special value of this system and
its proposition as a secure layer for users that demand
protection based on physical principles.
The central problem is how to distribute over the Inter-
net secure sequences of random bits Ri. This is the main
puzzle with a solution presented in this work. Before
discussing this fundamental problem and the proposed
solution, one may state that if this is true, it is clear
that ciphered messages based on one-time-pad could be
sent over any physical channel with no need to further
obscure the transmission for protection. The cipher mes-
sage could even be made public because the protection
is guaranteed by the one-time-pad method itself. As an-
other consequence, no intrusion detection mechanism will
be needed.
Use of classical carriers to carry recorded quantum in-
formation is a normal process that is often not perceived.
Scientific journals use this process constantly –although
they do not require a special protection. Understanding
quantum phenomena as sets of probable events or differ-
ent possible quantum trajectories, the classical informa-
tion obtained from instrumental clicks is nothing more
than recording one amongst the many possible quantum
trajectories. Repetition of the same measurement op-
eration may lead to a very distinct result; that is to
say, a record of another trajectory among the possible
ones. The files to be sent over the Internet are to be
obtained in samplings of single events (bits). The infor-
mation protection desired relies on the multitude of pos-
sible quantum trajectories that generates each single bit
of the random sequence. This is completely different from
using pseudo noise generated in a deterministic process
(hardware stream ciphers), whose generation mechanism
can be searched, discovered and used by the attacker [6].
One may easily argue, for example, that phase flucta-
tions on a laser output or in thermal radiation are not
quantum. Both can be represented by Gaussian random
processes. Several definitions (e.g. Glauber’s Positive
P representation [7] or Mandel’s Q parameter [8]) can
be utilized to classify these fluctuations as Poissonian or
super-Poissonian. Light in a coherent state will be at the
boundary between the “classical” and “quantum” realms.
Although the question if electromagnetic radiation can
be classified as classical or quantum is probably a philo-
sophical question, the importance of the uncontrollable
or unpredictable physical fluctuation in both representa-
tions is the important aspect to be utilized in this work.
Sometimes the expression “quantum fluctuations” will
be utilized by the author to express fluctuations asso-
ciated with the light field. The reader may ignore the
“quantum” adjective with no harm for ideas presented.
A quantum calculation is often quite adequate to deal
with light fluctuations and will be utilized.
This work will discuss the physically built-in proper-
ties of these secure files. It will also explains why one-
time-pad keys can be created and shared by A and B
through the Internet. This is basically about physics,
not a discussion about software or deterministic (pseudo-
random) stream cipher hardware. The security is intrin-
sically connected with fluctuations of the light field. Be-
fore discussing the information content in this process,
the Section will describe the basic standard distribution
protocol. After this description, it is explained how the
recorded files carry the noise protection.
THE DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL
The deterministic signals going through arbitrary com-
munication channels are encrypted by random signals ob-
tained from optical sources and are described by non-
orthogonal M -ry bases. Distribution of secure data
3[9, 10] and key distribution over optical channels using
M -ry bases has been discussed on recent publications
[11–13]. The security of the key distribution process de-
scribed here relies on a few points: 1) A shared secrecy by
users A and B on a starting key sequenceK0 and 2) a bit-
by-bit uncertainty Nature-made noise associated to each
bit and recorded on a interleaved M -ry non-orthogonal
bases.
In short, knowledge of K0 gives the legitimate users
the first mapping of the bases generated by the emitter
and allow B to recover each bit inscribed on every basis
used. Sequences of fresh random bits, by its turn, will be
generated by a truly random process and sent one-by-one
between users A and B. Subsequent privacy amplification
procedures statistically exclude the eventually compro-
mised fraction of shared bits. The batch of secure shared
secret bits (distilled bits) will be used for one-time-pad
encryption. The physical noise from the bit generator
protects each bit from the attacker E (Eve) and provides
the information security level associated with all Ri.
The signals associated to the key sequences Ri are cre-
ated by a physical random generator(PhRG). The noise
Ni associated with each bit Ri inscribed onto the M -ry
nonorthogonal basis (M ≥ 2) produces the uncertainty
seen by the attacker. This implies that the emitter has to
be equipped to detect and record the signals generated
by the PhRG. In other words, the definition of the mea-
suring system is made by the emitter, not the attacker.
The signal sent is the signal controlled and measured by
the emitter with a detection system of his choice. No
restrictions are placed on the attacker to obtain the ex-
changed signals on a public channel. Perfect copies of
the transmission signals can be made public. Among
the properties of the proposed system are: 1) Any pub-
lic channel may be used for transmission (optical fibers,
TV, microwave, and so on); 2) The deterministic signals
can be amplified with no security loss; 3) Signals can
be converted from electromagnetic to electrical and back
to electromagnetic with no security loss; 4) Wavelength
multiplexing is allowed on the network; 5) Current Net-
work and IP protocols can be used with no modifications
for users in any IP classes.
Fig. 1 shows a block diagram for one cycle of the key
distribution system. Just to describe the protocol and
make contact with some of the available literature ([11]
to [13]) on M−ry cryptography, a description starting
with a M−ry system of levels uniformly distributed on
the phase circle will be presented. At the end, the M−ry
system will be simplified to M = 2 for a speed-up in the
communication process with no security loss.
The protocol
A and B share a starting random key sequence
(#1) designated by K0 (#2) of length L (See Fig.
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FIG. 1: A sketch of one cycle of operations of the key distri-
bution process in the Noise Secured Internet is shown.
1). These L bits are divided into blocks of size kM
(b(kM ), b(kM−1), ...b(k1)) and each block defines ran-
domly a basis k0i over a nonorthogonal set of bases. As
an example, a uniformly distributed set of bases can be
used, being described on a ciphering wheel (#3) [11] with
M bases, where M = 2kM .
k0i = b(kM )2
kM−1 + b(kM−1)2
kM−2 + ...b(k1)2
0 . (1)
The phase values defining each basis are then given by
φk0i = pi
[
k0i
M
+
1− (−1)k0i
2
]
, k0i = 0, 1, ...M − 1. (2)
In these bases, a bit 1 will be inscribed displaced by pi
with respect to bit 0 over each basis.
A PhRG (#5) generates random bits R1i (#6) that A
would like to transfer securely to B. These signals con-
tain noise N1i (#7) with a natural phase distribution
(e.g., noise inherent to coherent states) of width σφ. R1i
can be understood in phase units (rd): values 0 or pi for
bits 0 and 1. For mesoscopic coherent states this noise
is appproximately Gaussian distributed with width σφ
(set such that σφ < pi/2). The signal to be sent over
the generic Internet communication channel (#8) (net-
work and servers) is Y1 = R1i+N1i+k0i. The combined
effects of N1i + k0i is to hide the bit value R1i on the
ciphering wheel (#9). Although containing random in-
formation Y1 is a deterministic signal and as such can
be amplified and converted into different signals through
arbitrary Internet nodes without any loss of security.
B has to extract R1i from Y1. To this end he utilizes
the same sequences from K0 utilized by A to generate
the base values k0i (#4). He subtracts this value from
Y1 and obtains R1i + N1i (#10) and obtain signals in
4binary bases (single ki value). The effect of the noise N1i
on B’s binary basis is negligible because σφ < pi/2 and his
decision on the bit value is easy; therefore, he obtains R1i
(#6). From the received sequence Ri he forms bit blocks
of length kM and constructs a new base sequence k1i.
The next steps are similar to the first ones. Bob’s PhRG
(#12) generates signal containing bits R2i (#13) associ-
ated to noiseN2i (#14). The signal Y2 = R2i+N2i+k1i is
sent over the communication channel (#8). The bit value
R2i is hidden by the overall noise N2i+ k1i (#15). From
her knowledge of R1i (#6) and, therefore, k1i (#14), Al-
ice subtracts k1i from Y2 and obtains R2i + N2i (#16).
On her binary basis she easily obtains R2i (#13). The
first cycle is complete. A and B continue to exchange
random sequences as in the first cycle. The shared se-
quences (R1i, ..., R2i, ...), after privacy amplification, are
the random bits to be subsequently utilized for one-time-
pad cipher.
Note that while for noiseless signals Y1 = b and Y2 = b
carrying a repeated bit b, one has Y1 ⊕ Y1 = 0, noisy
signals give Y1 = b + N1 and Y1 = b + N2 and, there-
fore, Y1 ⊕ Y1 = N1 + N2(= 0 or 1). This frustrates
correlation attacks and algebraic attacks constituted of
addition-mod2 between bits. These attacks are efficient
against pseudo random encrypted signals in a noiseless
carrier.
THE PHYSICAL RANDOM GENERATOR
The random generator is the principal equipment
needed to implement NSI for users A and B. After a brief
description of a possible random generator, its physical
aspects will be discussed. For secure transmission of sig-
nals physical randomness is necessary because no known
mathematical algorithm has been proven to generate true
random numbers. Several physical sources may be used
to this end such as optical or thermal sources. Optical
sources can be much faster than the thermal ones and
are therefore necessary when speed is required. It is im-
portant to say that commercial truly random generators
already exists for moderate speeds [3] what makes im-
mediate NSI implementations possible. Fig. 2 shows a
sketch of a PhRG with a coherent light source modulus.
While several design variations are possible, the PhRG
shown can achieve fast speeds compatible with optical
channels. The laser beam is divided by a beam splitter
BS. The upper part shows a detecting system where sig-
nals Vi are generated corresponding to the sign of the
generated signal with respect to the average signal in-
tensity. These binary signals are converted into binary
voltages VR = ±Vpi that constitute fresh random bits to
be shared by A and B. The bottom part shows an inter-
ferometer with an optical phase modulator (φ mod) in
one of the arms. Added voltages VK0 + VR are applied
to the phase modulator. This way bits are created in
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FIG. 2: Sketch of PhRG with a coherent light source. This
modulus can work internally or externally to a computer. The
laser beam is divided by a beam splitter BS. The upper part
shows a detecting system where signals Vi are generated cor-
responding to the sign of the generated signal with respect to
the average signal intensity. The laser beam is adjusted to an
adequate intensity by a neutral density filter (or automatized
filter). Voltage values VK0 defining M -ry phase bases (e.g,
M = 2) are added to VR and applied to the phase modulator.
randomly chosen non-orthogonal bases. Detectors at the
interferometer output produce the phase signals carrying
basis, bit and noise information shown in Figure 1 as Yi.
These values are automatically recorded and carry ana-
log information that may be transmitted in binary form.
The phase uncertainty is approximatelly given (see Refs.
[11] and [12]) by the Gaussian distribution
pu ≃ e−(∆φ)2/2σ2φ , (3)
where σφ =
√
2/〈n〉 and 〈n〉 is the average number of
photons in one bit. Availability of PhRG modules in
public places like a cybercafe may be convenient and less
costly for many users. They may generate and record on
portable memories a batch of secure keys or use them to
exchange one-time-pad ciphered information.
SIMPLIFIED BASES
Use of a non-uniform set of bases leads to a more eco-
nomical system: instead of the uniformly spaced circle of
phases given by Eq. (2) one may use just a sector of phase
values where the number of bases is justM = 2. See Fig.
3. ∆φ1 is the space between two bases and should be kept
∆φ1 ≪ pi/2. 〈n〉 is adjusted so that pi/2 > σφ ≫ ∆φ1.
Two states or bits can be inscribed on each basis. While
only two possible states are to be written on the same ba-
sis (binary states), one should recall that the noise added
may require other angle positions (going to a continuum
as necessary) to be experimentally recorded as well. A
simple procedure could be placing the recorded signal
52 2 2 / nφσ = ¢ ²
1φ∆
0k = 1k =
FIG. 3: A ciphering set of bases in a phase sector withM = 2.
σφ is the standard deviation in the phase caused by fluctua-
tions in the light field. ∆φ1 is the spacing between two bases
and should be kept ∆φ1 ≪ pi/2. 〈n〉 is adjusted so that
pi/2 > σφ ≫ ∆φ1. Two states or bits can be inscribed on
each basis. Dark circles indicate positions for a bit 0 and
open circles give possible positions for a bit 1.
(representing bit, basis and noise) always equal to the
nearest phase position. This way, just the phase values
shown on Fig. 3 will be needed.
Phase positions in the sth-sequence of random bits on
this M = 2 sector are given by
φs,i = (1−Rs−1,i)pi
[
1− (−1)Rs,i
2
]
+
+Rs−1,i
(
pi
[
1 + (−1)Rs,i
2
]
+∆φ1
)
, k0i = 0, 1.(4)
i gives the ith term in the s-sequence of length L. The
first random sequence R0,i is the shared sequence K0.
LIGHT SIGNALS AND INFORMATION
Signals to be generated by the PhRG are phase modu-
lated coherent signals. A specific φk modulation will be
described by
|αeiφk〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
(
αeiφk
)n
√
n!
|n〉 . (5)
Assume positive α = |α|. On the M = 2 sector
shown in Fig. 3 the phase modulation angles are φk =
(0,∆φ1, pi, pi+∆φ1). Each one of these values is randomly
by Ri according to Eq. 4. Statistically, the allowed val-
ues are equally distributed with 1/4 probability for each
of the angles. It is easy to describe the desired proper-
ties utilizing a quantum formalism. The density matrix
ρ̂ describing these possibilities is
ρ̂ =
1
4
(|αei0〉〈αei0|+ |αei∆φ1〉〈αei∆φ1 |
+|αeipi〉〈αeipi |+ |αei(pi+∆φ1)〉〈αei(pi+∆φ1)|
)
.(6)
From now on the notation |φi〉 = (|0〉, |∆φ1〉, |pi〉, |pi +
∆φ1〉) will be used for the modulated coherent states.
As the interest is on small angular separation ∆φ1, one
may write the matrix elements of ρ̂ up to the first order
O(∆φ11):
〈φi|ρ̂|φk〉 =
1
4

1 ρ̂0,∆φ1 ρ̂0,pi ρ̂0,pi+∆φ1
ρ̂∆φ1,0 1 ρ̂∆φ1,pi ρ̂∆φ1,pi+∆φ1
ρ̂pi,0 ρ̂pi,∆φ1 1 ρ̂pi,pi+∆φ1
ρ̂pi+∆φ1,0 ρ̂pi+∆φ1,∆φ1 ρ̂pi+∆φ1,pi 1
 (7)
where
ρ̂0,∆φ1 = ρ̂pi,pi+∆φ1 =
(
1 + i|α|2∆φ1 tanh(2|α|2)
)
,
ρ̂∆φ1,0 = ρ̂pi+∆φ1,pi =
(
1− i|α|2∆φ1 tanh(2|α|2)
)
, (8)
and all other terms (i 6= k) are equal to ρ̂ik = sech(2|α|2).
Diagonalization of 〈φi|ρ̂|φk〉 gives the eigenvalues λi and
orthonormal eigenstates |Ψi〉 (up to order ∆φ1):
λ1 = 0, (9)
|Ψ1〉 = 1N
[
eiφC |0〉 − |∆φ1〉 − eiφC |pi〉+ |pi +∆φ1〉)
]
λ2 = sech(2|α|2) sinh2(|α|2), (10)
|Ψ2〉 = 1N
[−eiφC |0〉 − |∆φ1〉+ eiφC |pi〉+ |pi +∆φ1〉)]
λ3 = 0, (11)
|Ψ3〉 = 1N
[−eiφT |0〉+ |∆φ1〉 − eiφT |pi〉+ |pi +∆φ1〉)]
λ4 =
1
2
(
1 + sech(2|α|2)) , (12)
|Ψ4〉 = 1N
[
eiφT |0〉+ |∆φ1〉+ eiφT |pi〉+ |pi +∆φ1〉)
]
,
where
λ2 + λ4 = 1, N = 2
√
2(1− e−〈n〉),
φC = arctan [〈n〉∆φ1 coth〈n〉] and
φT = arctan [〈n〉∆φ1 tanh〈n〉] . (13)
The eigenvalues give the probability of occurrence of the
states |Ψi〉. Due to the non-orthogonality of the bases
used, a modulated state |φi〉 has projections on all eigen-
states |Ψi〉.
Von Neumann and Shannon entropies
Statistically, the Von Neumann entropy H(α) associ-
ated with the random bits is given by the eigenvalues of
ρ̂:
H(α) = −λ2 log2 λ2 − λ4 log2 λ4 . (14)
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FIG. 4: Von Neumann entropy showing the fast transition
from the quantum regime to the classical bit regime. |α| =√
〈n〉, where 〈n〉 is the average number of photons per bit
signal.
Fig. 4 shows H(α) as a function of the coherent ampli-
tude |α|. It is interesting to see that for very small am-
plitude |α| (or small number of photons |α|2 = 〈n〉 < 1)
the signal carries less than one bit information. Four
states can be used and two of them describes the same
bit (two bits in the same basis). As the probability to
sent one of the states is 1/4, the probability to have one
of the two bits sent is 2×1/4. Consistently, this gives the
maximum Shannon entropy (as the classical limit of Von
Neumann’s entropy) HS = 2× (1/2) log2(1/(1/2)) = 1.
Phase distribution
The experimental determination of phase in the quan-
tum regime has been subject of intense study and contro-
versies –for a short review, see [8]. Mesoscopic and classi-
cal states are established with less controversy. Ref. [14]
introduced simple definitions for phase state and phase
distributions that have been frequently used. They will
be adopted here. Thus, in terms of number state bases,
the definition of phase state will be
|φ〉 = 1√
q + 1
q∑
n=0
einφ|n〉 , (15)
where q is the number of states taken on a truncated
space of the oscillator Hilbert space [14]. It leads to
a classical phase state for large q and it is quite ade-
quate for numerical calculations. Introduce a discrete,
orthonormal and complete set of these states
φdm =
2pim
q + 1
(m = 0, 1, ...q), (16)
defined up to an arbitrary fixed reference phase value
(The index d is just to identify the discrete character of
this phase). Thus, 〈φdk|φdl〉 = δkl. A phase operator is
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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FIG. 5: Phase distribution for 〈n〉 = 25 as a function of ∆φ1
values. For large values of ∆φ1 the decision over pi or pi+∆φ1
is easily made. For small ∆φ1 the two distributions merge
together. q = 300 was used to truncate Eq. (19).
defined by
φ̂ =
q∑
n=0
φdm|φdm〉〈φdm| . (17)
Given a density operator ρ̂, the phase distribution p(φ)
is obtained as
p(φdm) = 〈φdm|ρ̂|φdm〉 , (18)
with normalization
∑q
m=0 p(φdm) = 1. From the den-
sity matrix, Eq. (6), the phase distribution (18) for all
possible realizations of the phase assignments can be cal-
culated. It gives
p(φdm) =
e−〈n〉
4(q + 1)
∑
φi
( q∑
n=0
|α|m√
n!
cosn(φi − φdm)
)2
+
(
q∑
n=0
|α|m√
n!
sinn(φi − φdm)
)2 , (19)
where φi = (0,∆φ1, pi, pi + ∆φ1) and m is the phase
index introduced in Eq. (16). Fig. 5 shows probabil-
ities for occurrences of phases assigned by the sender.
Fig. 5 illustrates phase distributions for a set of ∆φ1
and 〈n〉 = 25. Large ∆φ1 values imply that recognition
for the attacker of the basis used by the user is easy and
leads to bit recover. On the other hand, for small ∆φ1
the linewidth well exceeds it.
A phase recorded by the sender is sent to the end user
and assumed recorded by the attacker as well. Recovering
the bit sent is the aim of both the end user and the
attacker’s. To the end user, bit recovered is easy because
it is just a decision between angle ranges (−pi/2, pi/2) or
from (pi/2, 3pi/2). The attacker, not knowing the basis
used, has to decide between a phase value or the neighbor
phase, distant from it by ∆φ1.
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FIG. 6: Signal-to-noise ratio for phase angle as a function of
the separation angle ∆φ1 for two values of 〈n〉, 25 and 400.
Signal-to-noise ratio for phase measurements
A measure of the attackers ability to recover a phase
φi sent is given by the fundamental signal-to-noise ratio
expressed by
SNRφi =
〈φi|φ̂|φi〉2
〈φi|φ̂2|φi〉 − 〈φi|φ̂|φi〉2
. (20)
The phase expected value 〈φ̂〉 and 〈φ̂2〉 are given by
〈φi|φ̂|φi〉 = 4
q∑
m=0
φdmp(φdm)φi , (21)
and
〈φi|φ̂2|φi〉 = 4
q∑
m=0
φ2dmp(φdm)φi . (22)
p(φdm)φi is the φi contribution to p(φdm). The attacker,
E, cannot succeed for SNRφi ≤ 1. It should be empha-
sized that the attacker does not have the capability to
perform measurements on the PhRG output. She obtains
single records sent by the user. Not even an ensemble of
data for each bit is sent by the user. A single recording
of a single measurement performed by the user’s instru-
ments is the only data available to the attacker. Fig.
6 shows the signal-to-noise ratio SNRφi for 〈n〉 = 25
and 〈n〉 = 400 as a function of ∆φ1. It is seen that for a
given 〈n〉 a small range of ∆φ1 values satisfy SNRφi ≤ 1.
Within this range, the attacker cannot succeed to obtain
the correct bit values (or corresponding phase values).
His probability of error by guessing over the recorded
data will be 1/2.
ATTACKS
One may wonder about the cost of a brute force at-
tack to determine the starting key K0 from the transmit-
ted signals. Under the assumption that the uncertainty
presented to the attacker cover some of the bases, the
attacker would know that the basis ki used in a given
transmission is around a given region within the uncer-
tainty Nσ.
For the M -ry system of uniformly spaced bases this
amounts that only a set of less relevant bits bk hide the
correct basis. These bk bits could be permutated in bk!
ways. As each bit could be either 0 or 1 the total num-
ber of permutations to be searched for each bit emission
would be (log2Nσ)!Nσ. For the total number of bits the
number of combinations would be
C = 2K0(log2Nσ)!Nσ . (23)
Under this example of a uniform ciphering wheel exem-
plified by Eq. (2), it is understood that the attacker may
know the fraction 1 − (Nσ/M) of the total number of
shared bits kM used by A and B to cipher a fresh gen-
erated bit. For a sequence of L shared bits, Eve may
obtain L[1 − (Nσ/M)] bits among L because they were
not covered by noise. An attack on the key cannot suc-
ceed due to simple reasons: K0 can be chosen with a
size that makes direct search computationally unfeasible
(exponential complexity in K0). After exchange of each
random sequence Ri –equally long as K0– privacy ampli-
fication procedures will be applied, leading to a shorter
random sequence for one-time-pad. One should stress
in this key distribution procedure the starting key K0 is
never to be open to the attacker. This eliminates any
possibility for E to explore correlations between K0 and
the distilled keys after privacy amplification. In fact, K0
can be destroyed after being used. Therefore, applying
key-search trials for ciphertext decryption on a known-
plaintext attack is doomed due the attacker’s computa-
tional capability.
For the M = 2 system all neighbouring levels are cov-
ered by noise (Nσ ≥ 2). For this case, the same C ∼ 2K0
makes unfeasible a brute force attack.
CONCLUSIONS
It has been shown that Internet users will succeed in
generating and sharing, in a fast way, a large number of
secret keys to be used in one-time-pad encryption. They
have to start from a shared secret sequence of random
bits and have a “hardware” modulus (Physical Random
Generator-PhRG) added to their computers. The
physical noise level is adjusted to hide the random bits
being sent. Although the transmitted signals could be
openly accessed, physical noise inherent to these signals
provide the protection. No intrusion detection method
is necessary. Privacy amplification protocols (dependent
on the M -ry system used) eliminate any fraction of
information that may have eventually obtained by the
attackers. As the security is not based on protocols
8supported by mathematical complexities in current
use, the security is not dependent on the difficulties of
factoring large numbers in their primes. It was then
shown that by sharing secure secret key sequences and
subsequent data encryption a secure Internet can be
practically implemented. The system can be easily
adjusted to follow any computational advance while
providing security. The random generator works at
optical speeds and the system does not require special
Internet communication protocols. Any network in
current use is adequate for this kind of operation. This
system is proposed as a possible new paradigm for a
secure Internet.
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